FROM ADC TO GENERAL?
Why Politicising ADC Appointments Endangers Military Professionalism in Nigeria
The recent promotion of the Nigerian President’s Aide-de-Camp (ADC) to the rank of Brigadier-General, without meeting any of the 4 mandatory criteria as set in the Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service (Officers) has reopened a necessary but uncomfortable conversation about military professionalism, promotions, and the dangers of proximity to power. This is not about personalities. It is about institutions, rules, and long-term damage.
GLOBAL BEST PRACTICE FOR ADC POSTINGS
Across professional militaries worldwide, ADC duty is a temporary trust posting, not a fast-track to senior rank. Nigeria should be no exception.
In the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India, ADCs to Heads of State or Government are typically Majors or Lieutenant-Colonels (or naval/air equivalents). They serve for a fixed tenure of 18 months to three years, and—critically—only once in their entire career. There is no automatic promotion, no waiver of time-in-rank, no bypass of promotion boards, and no political discretion to leapfrog statutory processes. ADC service may enhance an officer’s exposure and experience, but it does not entitle him to rank.
Even in France—where the President is constitutionally powerful—ADC promotions remain tightly regulated by statute and boards. The firewall is deliberate to prevent abuse of privilege.
WHY SUCH RIGIDITY? Because militaries have learned the hard way that prolonged or repeated ADC service is dangerous. In most professional systems, an officer is allowed to serve as ADC only once and must then return to operational or command duties—what in Nigerian military parlance we simply call “proper soja work.” ADCs are not meant to become courtiers. They are meant to remain soldiers.
This is where Nigeria’s current practice becomes troubling.
It is becoming a very bad tradition within the Nigerian military and police system. We now see officers who become de facto “Permanent ADCs”—serving multiple tours, enjoying open-ended tenures, and accumulating informal power not derived from law or command. This is not harmless. It is pernicious.
“Permanent ADCs” often use their closeness to power brokers to subvert the very processes of the institutions they belong to. They interfere—directly or indirectly—in postings, promotions, discipline, and access. They intimidate peers without authority, undermine promotion boards without accountability, and create a whisper system where officers begin to believe that merit no longer matters—access does.
Over time, this corrodes morale. Officers stop trusting evaluation reports, courses, and boards. A court culture replaces a command culture. Loyalty to individuals overtakes loyalty to institutions. This is precisely why serious militaries impose hard tenure limits and force ADCs back to the field, to command, or to instruction. An officer who cannot return to “soja work” after ADC duty was never suitable for the role in the first place.
The recent promotion of a presidential ADC to Brigadier-General, therefore, raises a fundamental question: under what law, regulation, or Armed Forces Order was this done? To date, there is no publicly known Nigerian statute or regulation that permits special promotion of ADCs, waiver of time-in-rank, or bypass of promotion boards purely based on proximity to the President.
If ADC appointment becomes a pathway to accelerated promotion, Nigeria will be institutionalising what other militaries have spent decades trying to prevent: the politicisation of rank.
This is not how objective civilian control works. True civilian control does not mean the arbitrary discretion of Mr President to do as he wishes in matters of military professionalism. It means rule-based authority exercised through institutions. Presidents command the armed forces—but they do not, and should not, personalise promotion systems.
The issue before Nigeria is therefore bigger than one officer or one promotion. It is about whether ADC duty remains what it is meant to be—a short, once-in-a-career trust posting—or mutates into an informal power position with career-skipping rewards.
If Nigeria wishes to align with professional military norms, the way forward is clear: ADC service should be limited to one tour only, tenure should be capped at two to three years, ADCs must return to operational or command roles, and there must be an explicit firewall preventing ADCs from influencing promotions, postings, or discipline. Above all, promotions must remain the exclusive preserve of boards, courses, time-in-rank, and performance—not proximity.
We must tread with caution before we start breeding a crop of military officers who believe merit is nothing and connections are everything.
Already in the larger society, we have Gen Zs who, if you say “Skills are better than degrees,” they answer back with “Connections are better than degrees and skills combined”. If this mindset enters our military, we may no longer have officers like the late Col Abu Alis. We will have Permanent ADCs who use their proximity to power to destroy the system.
Winston Churchill once said: A (military) medal may glitter, but it always casts a shadow. By the same token, President Asiwaju Bola Ahmed Tinubu may wish to go ahead and pin a shiny new General rank on his ADC. The rank will glitter. But it will cast a very long shadow. Among both serving and retired officers and men, the beneficiary on an unearned promotion will forever be looked upon as a ” counterfeit General”.
I hope Mr President, as Commander-in-Chief, saves the young man from this embarrassment. And refrains from casting a long shadow over Nigeria’s military professionalism.
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